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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
RICHARD M. GURULE, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 920099-CA 
Priority No. 2 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2a-3(2)(e) (Supp. 1992), whereby the Court of Appeals has 
jurisdiction over interlocutory appeals in criminal cases except 
those involving charges of first degree or capital felonies. 
Appellant is charged with a single count of aggravated assault, a 
third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (1953 
as amended). 
Pursuant to Rule 5, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, 
Appellant filed a timely petition for interlocutory review. On 
March 26, 1992, this Court entered its order granting Appellant's 
petition for interlocutory review. A copy of that order is attached 
as Addendum A. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The text of relevant constitutional provisions is contained 
in Addendum B. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue; Did the trial court err in altering its prior 
suppression order to allow the admission of "eyewitness 
identification evidence obtained prior to the illegal search and 
seizure"? 
Standard of Review, This Court reviews the trial court's 
factual findings under a clearly erroneous standard of review. 
However, the question of "whether these facts are sufficient to 
demonstrate reliability is a question of law, which [this Court] 
review[s] for correctness." State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 782 
(Utah 1991); see also State v. Mincv, 192 Utah Adv. Rep. 17, 21 
(Utah App. 1992). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
In an Information dated June 15, 1990, the State charged 
Appellant, Richard Gurule, with one count of aggravated assault, a 
third degree felony, and one count of trespass, a class B 
misdemeanor. R. 6-7. The trespass charge was dismissed, and the 
charge of aggravated assault was bound over to the district court. 
R. 3, o• 
On September 27, 1990, Mr. Gurule moved to suppress 
"statements of witnesses relating to their identification of 
RICHARD M. GURULE at the trial . . . and to suppress their in court 
identification of him," claiming that such evidence violated federal 
and state due process. R. 20. A copy of this motion to suppress is 
contained in Addendum C. 
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On March 19, 1991, Mr. Gurule moved to suppress "all 
evidence acquired subsequent to, or as the result of the illegal 
entry into defendant's home in violation of the Fourth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution and Article I Section 14 of the Utah 
State Constitution." R. 25. A copy of this second motion to 
suppress is also contained in Addendum C. 
On April 11, 1991, the trial judge held an evidentiary 
hearing on both motions. The transcript of that hearing is 
contained in the record on appeal and referred to as R. 147-367. 
On April 17, 1991, the trial judge made a minute entry 
indicating that Mr. Gurule's motions were granted. R. 31. See 
Addendum D for copy of April 17, 1991 minute entry. 
On May 8, 1991, the trial judge signed Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law which had been submitted that day by defense 
counsel. R. 32-36. A copy of such Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law is contained in Addendum E. 
On May 15, 1991, the State filed objections to the Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law. R. 37. 
In a hearing held June 21, 1991, the trial judge stated 
that his prior ruling did not "preclude the state from offering 
evidence of events prior to the search." R. 369.1 He then gave the 
parties an opportunity to brief the issue of whether pre-seizure 
identification testimony was admissible. R. 41, 372. Appellant's 
1. The transcript of the hearings held on June 21, 1991 and 
October 19, 1991 is contained in a single volume and marked 
R. 368-378. 
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memorandum on this issue is found at R. 50-59; the State's 
memorandum is found at R. 42-9. 
Thereafter, the trial judge ruled that eyewitness 
identification evidence which occurred prior to the illegal search 
and seizure was admissible, if otherwise competent, and that such 
evidence was not to be suppressed as part of his prior suppression 
order. R. 126; Addendum F. On January 28, 1992, the trial judge 
entered Supplemental Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
R. 128-131. A copy of the Supplemental Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law is contained in Addendum G. 
Pursuant to Rule 5, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, 
Mr. Gurule timely petitioned this Court for interlocutory review of 
the January 28, 1992 order allowing the admission of pre-seizure 
identification evidence. On March 26, 1992, this Court entered its 
order granting such interlocutory review. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The trial judge made the following factual findings which, 
except for the date of the incident, are supported by the record and 
not clearly erroneous2: 
1. On May 1, 1990 officers from the West Valley Police 
Department responded to an alleged aggravated assault situation at 
2. The record cite following each finding indicates the transcript 
page or pages on which this Court can find support for the finding. 
The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are contained in 
Addendum E and can be found in the district court file at R. 32-6. 
This Statement of Facts quotes those findings verbatim. 
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3215 South Oriole Way.3 R. 261, 295, 326. 
2. That upon arriving the officers heard witnesses 
proclaim that someone that might be responsible for the aggravated 
assault had run in to the residence at 2561 Starling Avenue. 
R. 262, 304. 
3. That 2561 Starling Avenue is the defendant's home. 
R. 340. 
4. That although the officers believed that witnesses had 
stated that the perpetrators had entered the residence on Starling 
Avenue, no witnesses had observed the perpetrator enter that 
residence. R. 184, 306, 359-60.4 
5. That there was no further investigation by the West 
Valley Police Officers prior to their entering the defendant's home 
and had there been further investigation it would have revealed that 
there was, in fact, no basis to believe that the perpetrator of the 
aggravated assault had entered the home. R. 262-3, 296, 304-6. 
3. The incident actually occurred in the early morning hours of 
May 5, 1990. R. 261. Officer Mattfeld responded first and was the 
officer in charge of the investigation. R. 261. Officers Mattfeld, 
Ivino and Call all testified that they responded to a "fight" rather 
than an aggravated assault. R. 261, 295, 326. 
4. Eddy Knowlden testified that there was a big fence around the 
Gurule home and only the roof of the Gurule home was visible from 
the Knowlden house. R. 184, 197. Rodney Knowlden testified that 
when Dale Haddenham was hit, Dale, Eddy, Rodney and possibly Jody 
were outside. R. 359. Rodney had the best view of the Gurule home, 
and he did not see the retreating assailant enter that house. 
R. 360. To the best of Rodney's knowledge, no one who witnessed the 
assault on Dale saw the assailant enter the Gurule house. R. 360. 
(continued) 
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6. That the officers pounded on the doors of the Gurule 
home on Starling Avenue until such time as Lynette Gurule came to 
the back door. R. 263-4, 330. 
7. That Ms. Gurule refused entry to the home indicating to 
the officers that a search warrant was required prior to entry. 
R. 265, 294, 309, 310, 331, 346.5 
8. That the officers entered the Gurule home in the face 
of the refusal by Lynette Gurule and in the absence of any consent 
by her. R. 265, 267, 287, 294. 
9. That upon entering the home defendant, Richard M. 
Gurule, was seized and he was subsequently forced to appear in a 
"show-up" procedure at which time witnesses to the alleged 
aggravated assault viewed his person. R. 300, 334-5. 
10. That the defendant was the only person in the 
(footnote 4 continued) 
Officer Ivino acknowledged that it was possible that none 
of the witnesses had seen the assailant enter the Gurule home. 
R. 305. The State did not present any witnesses who claimed to have 
seen the perpetrator enter the Gurule home. Dan Dimick testified 
that he saw four or five men go around the rear of a corner house. 
R. 252. It is not clear whether he was referring to the Gurule 
home, but even if he were, he did not testify that he saw the men go 
inside and could not connect them to the incident at the Knowlden 
house. R. 252, 256. Mr. Dimick did not know if the four were 
Hispanic. R. 256. Officer Mattfeld claimed that some unknown 
person had told him that he or she saw the perpetrators enter the 
house but could not recall who that person was. R. 284. 
5. Officer Mattfeld testified that he could not recall Ms. Gurule 
asking for a search warrant. R. 284. Lynette and Danielle Gurule 
testified that Lynette did ask for a search warrant. R. 331, 346. 
The trial judge's finding that Ms. Gurule requested a search warrant 
is further indication that the trial judge did not find all aspects 
of Officer Mattfeld7s testimony credible. 
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"show-up" which matched the physical description of the aggravated 
assault perpetrator. R. 245. 
11. That there was conflicting testimony in regards as to 
whether the eyewitnesses viewed the participants in the "show-up" 
individually or collectively; that is, while discussing the matter 
with each other. But that in any event at least some of the persons 
claiming to have made an eyewitness identification of the defendant 
had the opportunity to observe other eyewitnesses choose defendant 
as the perpetrator of the offense prior to making their own 
determination. R. 215-17, 269, 276, 277, 302, 313, 339, 340, 352, 
353-4. 
12. That the eyewitnesses had been drinking prior to 
making identification and in at least one instance were drinking 
beer at the time the identification was made. R. 273, 353. 
13. That the police failed to obtain or maintain any 
permanent record regarding descriptions of the assailant given by 
the eyewitnesses prior to the time the "show-up" occurred. R. 262, 
263, 274, 316.6 
14. That the police failed to record which of the 
eyewitnesses identified the defendant as the perpetrator of the 
6. Officers Mattfeld and Ivino testified that they did not record 
any descriptions given prior to the showup. R. 280, 305-7. Nor did 
Officer Mattfeld recall the descriptions. R. 280. Mattfeld 
testified that he handed out witness statement forms before the 
showup and that the statements "were started at that point in time" 
(R. 275), but he did not testify as to when the statements were 
completed or otherwise demonstrate that any descriptions in the 
statements were recorded before the showup tainted the witnesses' 
perception. Officer Call went straight to the Gurule home when he 
arrived. R. 326. 
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assault* R. 278. 
15. That the police failed to record which of the 
eyewitnesses identified Richard Gurule as the person who while in 
the house prior to the assault on Mr. Haddenham assaulted Dorothy 
Knowlden and therefore could not have been the assailant of the 
victim, Mr. Haddenham. R. 279, 280, 359. 
16. That the two eyewitnesses that testified in regards to 
their opportunity to observe the actual assault, testified one had 
five seconds and the other observed the assailant for two seconds. 
Both witnesses acknowledged that it was a stressful situation and 
their attention was diverted by factors such as, other persons 
coming at them. R. 182, 205, 206. 
The following facts are also relevant to the issue of 
whether the pre-seizure identification was so tainted by the 
subsequent suggestive procedure and fourth amendment violation so as 
to make any pre-seizure identification evidence unreliable and 
inadmissible. 
When Officer Mattfeld first arrived at the Knowlden home on 
Oriole Way, people were out in the street pointing to the house on 
Starling Avenue. R. 262, 295. The scene was chaotic, and the 
officer briefly talked with people in the street. R. 262, 263, 273, 
295. He did not record the names of the people he spoke with or the 
information they gave him, and could not recall the names or 
information during the suppression hearing. R. 262, 274. The State 
was unable to demonstrate who the officer talked to, whether those 
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people had observed the incident at the Knowlden house or anything 
else that was relevant to this case, or what the officer was in fact 
told before he decided to enter the house. 
Officer Ivino testified that he proceeded to the Starling 
Avenue home because there were people in the street pointing at that 
house and yelling that "they went in there." R. 304. Officer Ivino 
did not know who these people were. R. 296, 304. He also 
acknowledged that it was possible that none of the witnesses 
actually saw the assailant run into the Gurule home. R. 305. He 
was not sure that the people who were in the street and pointing at 
the Gurule house had been in the Knowlden home when the incident 
occurred. R. 306. 
Although various witnesses were pointing at the Gurule 
home, no one said that the person who hit Mr. Haddenham was their 
neighbor, Richard Gurule. R. 198, 271, 281. 
The officers did not record which persons appeared in the 
showup, and Officer Mattfeld was not certain how many men were 
presented to the witnesses in that procedure. R. 275. The 
witnesses gave varying estimates as to the number of people who 
appeared in the showup. 
The persons seized inside the Gurule home stood in a line 
behind a chainlink fence. R. 301. Headlights from vehicles were 
used to illuminate the persons in the showup. R. 301. 
Officer Ivino heard two of the witnesses yell, "that's him, that's 
him." At least one of the witnesses said, "that's him, but he had a 
different shirt on." R. 302. The person yelling also gestured and 
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pointed at Appellant. R. 313. The people standing around outside 
could see the gesture. R. 313. 
Officer Accocks also heard one of the witnesses say, 
"That's him there," and saw the witness point to Appellant. R. 322. 
Officer Ivino testified that two people selected 
Mr. Gurule. R. 314. The officer could remember only one of these 
people. R. 314. Officer Ivino had no records and could not recall 
if he had filed a report. R. 316. 
Officer Mattfeld recalled that only one of the witnesses, 
Mr. Knowlden,7 selected Mr. Gurule as the perpetrator of the 
aggravated assault. R. 270, 271, 277. Eddy Knowlden wears 
corrective lenses but did not have them on that night. R. 283. 
Officer Mattfeld was unaware that Eddy needed corrective lenses to 
see properly. R. 283. The officer did not recall how many people 
he brought over for an attempt to identify, and he did not record 
that information. He estimated he asked four to six people to make 
an identification, but he did not put that in his report and could 
not recall if any more than one person had selected Mr. Gurule. 
R. 278. The others identified Mr. Gurule as being in the residence 
but did not see who hit Mr. Haddenham. R. 271. 
Two of the witnesses identified Mr. Gurule as being the 
person who tore Mrs. Knowlden's fingernail and slammed the door in 
her face. R. 279. This was the person Mr. Haddenham was chasing 
and could not have been the person who stepped from behind a car and 
7. It is unclear whether Officer Mattfeld was referring to Eddy or 
Rodney Knowlden. 
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hit him. R. 280. In other words, while at least three witnesses 
apparently selected Mr. Gurule, they attributed conflicting roles to 
him, one of which would have absolved him of the charges in the 
instant case. 
Several of the witnesses selected Eloy Esguivel as being a 
person who was in the Knowlden house. R. 283. However, the police 
investigation established that Mr. Esquivel was at the La Frontera 
Restaurant at the time of the incident in the Knowlden home. R. 283. 
Dorothy Knowlden did not see the person who hit Dale. 
R. 158. She was confused and uncertain about who was in her house. 
R. 166. She thought everyone looked alike. R. 167. She did not 
give a pre-seizure description to officers. R. 165. 
Eddy Knowlden saw the person who hit Dale but apparently 
did not have his corrective lenses in and was preoccupied by the 
crowd with bats and beer cans and the person with a bat who came 
after him from behind a tree. R. 177, 185. There is no evidence of 
a pre-seizure description by him. 
Rodney Knowlden was about eleven feet away from Dale's 
assailant. R. 229. He, too, was aware of the crowd and other 
activity. R. 227-9. Although he claimed to have made a pre-seizure 
description, the trial judge found otherwise based on the testimony 
of the officers. R. 35, 280. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The State presented testimony regarding the identifications 
by three witnesses. By failing to present testimony regarding any 
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descriptions by other witnesses, the State has failed to sustain its 
burden of establishing the reliability and admissibility of 
pre-seizure descriptions by any other witnesses. 
The State also failed to sustain its burden of establishing 
the reliability and admissibility of any pre-seizure descriptions by 
the three witnesses. The trial judge found both a due process and 
fourth amendment violation. An analysis of the factors applicable 
to each violation establishes that each violation mandates 
suppression of "pre-seizure" identification testimony. 
Applying the five Ramirez/Long factors to any "pre-seizure" 
description by Dorothy, Rodney and Eddy Knowlden requires 
suppression. Most compelling is the fact that the officers did not 
keep a record of any pre-seizure descriptions. 
The fourth amendment violation also requires suppression of 
any "pre-seizure" descriptions. The State cannot establish that the 
witnesses' "knowledge of and ability to reconstruct the prior 
criminal occurrence and to identify the defendant" is from an 
independent recollection of observations at the time of the crime. 
Nor can the State establish that the charge against Mr. Gurule is 
not the fruit of the fourth amendment violation. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT. THE TRIAL COURTS RULING REGARDING THE 
ILLEGALLY OBTAINED EVIDENCE NECESSARILY REQUIRES 
THAT THE EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION TESTIMONY 
OBTAINED PRIOR TO THE ENTRY OF THE GURULE HOME 
AND SUBSEQUENT SHOWUP BE SUPPRESSED. 
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In the present case, Mr. Gurule filed two separate motions 
to suppress, each of which was directed at suppressing the same 
evidence. The first motion moved "to suppress statements of 
witnesses relating to their identification of RICHARD M. GURULE at 
the trial . . . and to suppress their in court identification of 
him11 based on the suggestive identification procedure utilized in 
this case. R. 20; see Addendum C. 
The second motion requested that the trial judge "suppress 
all evidence acquired subsequent to, and as a result of the illegal 
entry into defendant's home in violation of the Fourth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 14 of the Utah 
Constitution." R. 25; see Addendum C. 
The trial judge concluded that both a due process and 
search and seizure violation occurred in this case, and granted both 
motions. R. 31. Although the trial judge later clarified that his 
ruling was not intended to suppress any pre-seizure identification 
testimony, his ruling that both a fourth amendment and an Article I, 
Section 7 violation occurred in this case remain in place. 
The State has the burden of establishing the reliability of 
any pre-seizure identification. Ramirez. 817 P.2d at 778. In the 
present case, three potential witnesses, Rodney, Eddy and Dorothy 
Knowlden, testified at the hearing. To the extent that any other 
witness with a "pre-seizure" description of the assailant might 
exist, the State has failed to sustain its burden of establishing 
the reliability of that witness' "pre-seizure" identification 
testimony. Furthermore, a review of the testimony at the hearing 
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establishes that the trial judge erroneously concluded that 
"pre-seizure" identification testimony by these three witnesses is 
admissible. 
A. THE STATE DUE PROCESS VIOLATION WHICH 
OCCURRED AS THE RESULT OF THE SUGGESTIVE SHOWUP 
REQUIRES THAT ANY TESTIMONY REGARDING PRE-SEIZURE 
DESCRIPTIONS OR IDENTIFICATIONS BE SUPPRESSED. 
In State v. Ramirez. 817 P.2d 774, 779-80 (Utah 1991), the 
Utah Supreme Court adopted an analytical model for assessing the 
admissibility of eyewitness identifications under the Utah 
constitution which is more rigorous than the federal model and which 
takes into account various scientific studies which deal with the 
reliability of eyewitness identification. The court required "an 
in-depth appraisal of the identification's reliability along the 
lines laid out in rState v.l Long [721 P.2d 483, 490 (Utah 1986)]" 
for assessing whether an identification procedure violates state due 
process so as to preclude admissibility of such evidence. Under the 
Utah constitution, "ft]he ultimate question to be determined is 
whether, under the totality of the circumstances, the identification 
was reliable." Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 781. 
The pertinent factors for determining reliability of an 
identification under the Utah constitution are: 
(1) [T]he opportunity of the witness to view the 
actor during the event; (2) the witness's degree 
of attention to the actor at the time of the 
event, (3) the witness's capacity to observe the 
event, including his or her physical and mental 
acuity; (4) whether the witness's identification 
was made spontaneously and remained consistent 
thereafter, or whether it was the product of 
suggestion; and (5) the nature of the event being 
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observed and the likelihood that the witness 
would perceive, remember and relate it 
correctly. This last area includes such factors 
as whether the event was an ordinary one in the 
mind of the observer during the time it was 
observed, and whether the race of the actor was 
the same as the observer's. 
Ramirez. 817 P.2d at 781, quoting Long, 721 P.2d at 493. 
The trial judge applied these Ramirez/Long factors, and 
determined that the showup identification was unduly suggestive, in 
violation of Article I, Section 7 of the Utah constitution. These 
factors are equally applicable in determining whether any 
pre-seizure identification evidence is admissible. 
Case law interpreting the federal constitution provides 
further guidance in determining whether the pre-seizure 
identifications are so tainted by the subsequent events that 
testimony regarding the pre-seizure identifications is inadmissible. 
In United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 18 
L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967), the United States Supreme Court addressed the 
issue of whether a witness could make an in-court identification of 
a defendant after having viewed the defendant at a lineup where the 
defendant was denied his right to counsel.8 The court recognized 
that without proper limits, an "accused/s conviction may rest on a 
courtroom identification in fact the fruit of a suspect pretrial 
identification which the accused is helpless to subject to effective 
scrutiny at trial." Wade, 388 U.S. at 235. 
8. Although the primary illegality in Wade was the denial of the 
right to counsel at the lineup, the court focused on the potential 
for misidentification and its effect on a fair trial in determining 
that a right to counsel exists at a lineup. 
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A rule limited solely to the exclusion of 
testimony concerning identification at the lineup 
itself, without regard to admissibility of the 
courtroom identification, would render the right 
to counsel an empty one. The lineup is most 
often used, as in the present case, to 
crystallize the witnesses7 identification of the 
defendant for future reference. We have already 
noted that the lineup identification will have 
that effect. The State may then rest upon the 
witnesses7 unequivocal courtroom identification, 
and not mention the pretrial identification as 
part of the State7s case at trial. Counsel is 
then in the predicament in which Wade7s counsel 
found himself—realizing that possible unfairness 
at the lineup may be the sole means of attack 
upon the equivocal courtroom identification, and 
having to probe in the dark in an attempt to 
discover and reveal the unfairness, while 
bolstering the government witness7 courtroom 
identification by bringing out and dwelling upon 
his prior identification. 
Allowing pre-showup identification testimony places a 
defendant in the same bind that allowing in-court identification 
creates. Eyewitnesses could testify to a pre-seizure description of 
the perpetrator, and the defendant would not be able to undermine 
that testimony by showing that the witnesses7 description was 
tainted by subsequent events. 
Recognizing these concerns, the Wade court, relying on 
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488, 83 S.Ct. 407, 
9 L.Ed.2d 441, 455 (1967), articulated the following test for 
determining whether an in-court identification will be allowed after 
a lineup held in violation of a defendant7s right to counsel. 
"Whether, granting establishment of the primary 
illegality, the evidence to which the instant 
objection is made has been come at by exploiting 
of that illegality or instead by means 
sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the 
primary taint." [citations omitted] Application 
of this test in the present context requires 
- 16 -
consideration of various factors; for example, 
the prior opportunity to observe the alleged 
criminal act, the existence of any discrepancy 
between any pre-lineup description, any 
identification prior to lineup of another person, 
the identification by picture of the defendant 
prior to the lineup, failure to identify the 
defendant on a prior occasion, and the lapse of 
time between the alleged act and the lineup 
identification. 
Wade. 388 U.S. at 241. 
In State v. Williams. 381 S.E.2d 265 (W.V. 1989), the court 
also explored the issue of whether a witness could make an in-court 
identification after a lineup was held in violation of the 
defendant's right to counsel. The court determined that any 
in-court identification was tainted by the prior proceedings, and 
that the cumulative effect of exposure to the defendant was 
"instrumental" in the witness' "growing certainty of appellant's 
identity as one of the robbers." See also Edwards v. State. 538 
So.2d 440, 442 (Fla. 1989). 
In order to admit identification testimony at trial, such 
testimony must "be reliable and based solely upon the witness' 
independent recollection of the offender at the time of the crime, 
uninfluenced by the intervening illegal confrontation. [citations 
omitted]." Id. at 442. In the present case, the trial judge's 
ruling appears to preclude an in-court identification but allow 
pre-seizure description. The analysis in Ramirez and Wade for 
assessing the reliability of an identification is similarly 
applicable to any pre-seizure descriptions. The potential for 
tainting a pre-seizure memory with information from subsequent 
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events mandates that the pre-seizure testimony be an independent, 
reliable recollection, untainted by the subsequent suggestive 
procedures, in order to be admissible. 
In the present case, the trial judge concluded that the 
Ramirez/Long factors demonstrated the unreliability of the showup 
procedure. Application of those factors to the identifications made 
by Rodney, Dorothy and Eddy Knowlden establishes that the trial 
judge erroneously concluded that pre-seizure identification 
testimony was admissible. 
1. DOROTHY KNOWLDEN 
The lack of reliability and need for suppression of any 
"pre-seizure" description by Mrs. Knowlden is demonstrated by the 
application of the five Ramirez/Long factors. 
a. Opportunity to View 
Mrs. Knowlden did not have the opportunity to view the 
perpetrator of the assault and had only a very limited opportunity 
to view the people in her house. R. 158, 164-6. The people who 
were in her house were there for only a couple of minutes, and she 
was excited and distracted by all the activity. R. 164-6. 
b. Degree of Attention to the Actor 
Mrs. Knowlden was distracted by the quick sequence of 
events, the number of people in her house, and her broken 
fingernail. R. 164-7. The person she paid the most attention to 
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was the person who broke her fingernail. R. 157-8, 166. 
Nevertheless, she had tremendous difficulty describing him. 
R. 164-6. Mrs. Knowlden's degree of attention to each individual in 
her house was very limited. Furthermore, the State failed to 
establish what degree of attention, if any, she paid to the person 
who might have been Mr. Gurule, if, in fact, he were even in her 
home. 
c. The Witness' Capacity to Observe 
Mrs. Knowlden is older and acknowledged that her age was 
affecting her perceptions. R. 166. She also pointed out that she 
got excited, which apparently affected her ability to perceive. 
R. 167. She acknowledged that the people in her house and in the 
showup all looked alike to her, even though Mr. Gurule was the only 
short, heavy-set man in the showup. R. 167_ She stated, "[w]ell, I 
thought they all looked a lot alike, but like I say, I get 
excited." R. 167. She testified that she was confused and was not 
sure who was in her kitchen. R. 166. She stated, "[t]there were 
too many young men in dark clothes and it happened so fast and I am 
getting old." R. 166. 
Mrs. Knowlden's capacity to observe was extremely limited. 
d. Whether Identification is Product of 
Suggestion 
Officers did not record any pre-seizure descriptions. 
Mrs. Knowlden testified that she did not talk to officers until 
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after the showup. R. 165. Under such circumstances, it is 
impossible for the State to sustain its burden of establishing that 
any description Mrs. Knowlden might adopt as the description prior 
to the seizure was not tainted by the subsequent events. 
Repeated exposure to a defendant can result in increased 
certainty that such person was the perpetrator. In this case, 
Mrs. Knowlden is now fully aware that Mr. Gurule is her neighbor. 
She has seen him at the showup, in court at the preliminary and 
motion hearings, and in her neighborhood. R. 170-1. 
At the motion hearing, Mrs. Knowlden appeared uncertain 
whether Mr. Gurule had been in her house. Under such circumstances, 
any pre-seizure description by Mrs. Knowlden is unreliable and 
should be suppressed. 
e. Nature of the Event 
Although the event was not ordinary, the excitement of the 
incident worked against Mrs. Knowlden being able to recall details. 
She was flustered and testified repeatedly that she was having 
difficulty because she got excited. R. 166, 167. In addition, the 
men in her house were all members of a different race. The impact 
of this racial difference in limiting Mrs. Knowlden's ability to 
identify the men in her house is emphasized by Mrs. Knowlden's 
testimony that they all looked alike to her even though the build 
and physical descriptions of the men differed markedly. 
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All five Ramirez/Long factors work against admission of 
Mrs. Knowlden's pre-seizure description. Application of these 
factors establishes that the trial judge incorrectly concluded that 
the State had sustained its burden of establishing the reliability 
of this testimony. 
Application of the Wade test also establishes that the 
State failed to sustain its burden of establishing the admissibility 
of a pre-seizure description by Mrs. Knowlden. As outlined above, 
Mrs. Knowlden had no opportunity to view the person who hit Dale and 
only a limited opportunity to view the various people in her house. 
There is no record of a pre-seizure description, which makes 
admission of such a description even less reliable than when there 
is a discrepancy. Without a record of a description given by 
Mrs. Knowlden prior to the seizure, the State could not sustain its 
burden of establishing the admissibility of any such testimony. 
2. EDDY KNOWLDEN 
The lack of reliability of any pre-seizure description by 
Eddy is demonstrated by application of the Ramirez/Long factors and 
the Wade test. 
a. Opportunity to View 
The distance at which Eddy viewed the assailant is not 
clear. He testified at the motion hearing that he was six to eight 
feet away but apparently testified at the preliminary hearing that 
he was eighteen feet away. Rodney testified that Eddy was twelve to 
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thirteen feet away. R. 239. Rodney, who was eleven feet from the 
assailant, got blood on his shirt when Dale was hit. R. 238. 
Rodney testified that no one other than the assailant was close 
enough to get blood on his shirt. Hence, it appears that Eddy was 
farther away than eight feet when Dale was hit. It was nighttime 
and the driveway was illuminated by a carport light and light from 
the kitchen window. Given the discrepancy in testimonies, it is 
unclear whether Eddy had an adequate opportunity to view the 
assailant. 
b. Degree of Attention to Person Who Hit Dale 
After Eddy emerged from the Knowlden house, he chased one 
individual while Dale chased another. R. 177. Eddy saw a number of 
people at the end of the driveway and in the street; some were 
throwing beer cans and making a lot of noise. R. 153. He also saw 
a person crouched behind a pine tree with something in his hands. 
R. 177. Eddy stopped running and started backing up towards the 
Knowlden house when that person jumped at him with a bat in his 
hands. R. 177. 
It was at this time that Eddy also saw "Dale going to the 
ground" and a "kid" standing nearby, holding something. R. 177-80. 
He also saw something fly through the air. R. 180. 
Eddy acknowledged that the event was traumatic, he did not 
know what happened, he was trying to figure out what occurred, and 
he was looking at everyone to see if someone else was going to get 
hit. R. 180, 195. 
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Eddy testified that everything seemed to stop for about ten 
seconds, "like someone hit pause on a VCR," when Dale was hit. 
R. 182.9 
During this time, Eddy looked back and forth from Dale to 
the person who hit Dale but was also preoccupied with the person 
coming at him from behind the pine tree and the crowd in the 
street. R. 183. 
Given the number of people Eddy was tuning into during a 
short period of time and Eddy's fear for his own safety, the degree 
of attention focused on Dale's assailant was limited. 
c. Capacity to Observe Event 
Eddy Knowlden is nearsighted and had removed his lenses 
earlier in the evening. R. 186. He had to get very close during 
the showup. 
Eddy testified that he was "freaked out" by the events and 
was trying to figure out what was happening. R. 195. 
Eddy's poor eyesight and confusion weigh against admission 
of any pre-seizure description by him. 
d. Whether Product of Suggestion 
Because there is no record of a pre-seizure description 
made by Eddy, the State cannot sustain its burden of establishing 
9. At the preliminary hearing, Eddy apparently testified that this 
"pause" lasted maybe five or as much as ten seconds. R. 205. 
Rodney testified that the pause lasted seven or eight seconds. 
R. 230. 
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that any pre-seizure identification is not the product of 
suggestion. The trial judge determined that the showup was 
suggestive? any pre-seizure description now adopted by Eddy would 
necessarily be tainted by his repeated viewing of Richard Gurule. 
Eddy testified that he did not recognize the stocky kid who 
hit Dale. R. 183. He had seen Richard Gurule before but did not 
name him as the perpetrator when he spoke to police. R. 197, 198. 
It was only during the showup when Eddy selected Mr. Gurule that he 
recognized his neighbor. R. 204. He was not sure, however, whether 
Mr. Gurule was one of the people who entered the house. R. 188. 
Eddy cannot remember details from the incident or what he 
told the officers on the night of the incident. He said his "memory 
about everything now is somewhat unclear." R. 222. He had trouble 
remembering testifying at the preliminary hearing because almost a 
year had passed. R. 197. He could not remember how many people 
were in the showup but thought there were five or six. R. 201. 
Officers apparently showed him the individuals at least twice. 
R. 211. 
Under such circumstances, the State cannot establish that 
any "pre-seizure" description Eddy might give is not tainted by the 
interviewing procedure and selection of Mr. Gurule. 
e. Nature of the Event 
Although the event was a traumatic one, the nature of the 
event seemed to work against Eddy's ability to perceive and recall a 
description of the assailant. 
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In addition, Appellant is Hispanic and Eddy is White. This 
weighs against the reliability of any description. 
Any pre-seizure description of the assailant is unreliable 
under the Ramirez/Long factors. 
3. RODNEY KNOWLDEN 
a. Opportunity to View 
Dale followed Eddy out of the house as Eddy ran behind 
Dale. R. 227. Rodney testified that he was about eight feet behind 
Dale when a person stepped from behind a truck and swing. Rodney 
"heard a loud thud and Dale landed on his back on the lawn." 
R. 229. Rodney was about eleven feet away from the assailant. 
R. 229. A carport light and light shining from the kitchen window 
illuminated the scene. R. 229. 
Rodney testified that the assailant looked right at him. 
Rodney also mentioned the pause that Eddy described as occurring 
immediately after Dale was hit, claiming that it lasted seven, eight 
seconds while he and the assailant stared at each other. R. 230. 
The lighting conditions and distance suggest that Rodney 
did not have a good opportunity to view the assailant. 
b. Degree of Attention 
When Rodney first got outside the Knowlden house, he saw 
people everywhere—on the lawn, in the street. R. 227. Although he 
testified that he looked directly at the assailant for seven or 
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eight seconds, his attention during that time was necessarily 
diverted by Dale, Eddy and the people in the street and driveway. 
R. 230. 
c. Capacity to Observe 
Not much evidence exists on this point. Rodney had 
apparently been drinking and made his showup selection about 
thirty-five feet away, based primarily on a beard. R. 231. 
d. Whether Product of Suggestion 
The trial judge found that "the police failed to obtain or 
maintain any permanent record regarding descriptions of the 
assailant prior to the time the 'showup' occurred." R. 34.10 This 
10. Officer Mattfeld did not record the physical description that 
each of the witnesses gave him. R. 280. He testified that there 
was no report that recorded the physical description given by the 
witnesses before the showup and that he did not have an independent 
recollection of the description. R. 280. 
Officer Mattfeld further testified that he "really had a 
poor identification as to who they were as far as just physical 
descriptions." R. 290. He testified that he only got statements as 
to what had happened before he went to the Gurule house. R. 274-5. 
After he entered the Gurule house, he returned to the witnesses and 
apparently gave them forms to fill out. He testified that the 
written statements "were started at that point in time" and the 
officer returned to the Gurule house and set up the showup. R. 275. 
Rodney testified that he filled out a written statement for 
police before being taken to the showup. R. 233. He indicated that 
he was asked to provide as much detail as possible. R. 234. He 
described the person as 5 feet 6 inches tall and weighing 200 
pounds, with a small beard at the end of his chin. R. 234. No 
other description was provided. R. 234. 
In light of such testimony, the trial judge's ruling is not 
clearly erroneous. 
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finding is supported by Officer Mattfeld's testimony that he did not 
record the physical description given by the witnesses before the 
showup, and he did not have an independent recollection of the 
description. R. 280. Officer Mattfeld also testified that he 
"really had a poor identification as to who they were as far as 
physical descriptions." R. 290. 
In addition, Officer Mattfeld testified that he only 
obtained statements as to what occurred before he entered the Gurule 
home. R. 274-5. After entering the home, Officer Mattfeld returned 
to the witnesses and apparently gave them forms to fill out. 
Officer Mattfeld testified that the written statements "were started 
at that point in time" and the officer returned to the Gurule 
house. R. 275. 
Although Rodney testified that he filled out the form 
before being taken to the showup (R. 233), the trial judge found 
otherwise. The trial judge7s finding was not against the clear 
weight of the evidence in light of Officer Mattfeld7s testimony and 
that of the other officers who indicated that they did not obtain 
descriptions before the showup. 
In the absence of a pre-seizure description, the State 
could not sustain its burden of establishing that any description 
the witnesses claimed to be a pre-seizure description was not the 
product of subsequent events. 
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e. Nature of the Event 
Although the event was not an ordinary one, its traumatic 
nature, coupled with the fact that many people were standing around 
who appeared threatening and who may have impacted on Rodney's 
perception, demonstrates that tuning into a specific face and 
recalling sufficient details would be extremely unlikely. The 
difficulty of making a reliable identification under such 
circumstances is underscored by the vague and general description 
Rodney gave. Despite the fact that officers told him to include as 
much detail as possible, Rodney identified his assailant as 5 feet 
6 inches tall, 200 pounds, with a small beard at the end of his chin. 
When the five Ramirez/Long factors are considered, it is 
apparent that the trial judge was incorrect in concluding that the 
State had sustained its burden of establishing the reliability of 
any pre-seizure identification testimony by Rodney. 
B. THE ILLEGAL SEIZURE REQUIRES SUPPRESSION OF 
ALL PRE-SEIZURE IDENTIFICATION EVIDENCE. 
The trial court's ruling that the entry into the Gurule 
home and seizure of Appellant violated the fourth amendment (R. 31, 
35-6) requires that all evidence that is a "fruit" or "product" of 
that seizure be suppressed. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 
471, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963). "The exclusionary 
prohibition extends as well to the indirect as the direct products" 
of such fourth amendment violations. United States v. Crews, 445 
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U.S. 463, 100 S.Ct. 1244, 63 L.Ed.2d 537 (1980), quoting Wong Sun, 
371 U.S. at 484. 
In United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, the United States 
Supreme Court considered the issue of whether "an in-court 
identification of the accused by the victim should be suppressed as 
the fruit of the defendant's unlawful arrest." 445 U.S. at 465. In 
Crews. the defendant was illegally arrested and transported to the 
police station, where officers photographed him. Thereafter, 
officers showed the victim a photo array which included the 
photograph taken of the defendant while he was being illegally held. 
The trial court in Crews ruled that the photo array and 
subsequent lineup were the products of the illegal arrest but that 
the victim had an independent, untainted recollection of the 
assailant and therefore could make an in-court identification. 
In analyzing whether a victim could make an in-court 
identification following a fourth amendment violation, the United 
States Supreme Court focused on three distinct elements. 
First, the victim is present at trial to testify 
as to what transpired between her and the 
offender, and to identify the defendant as the 
culprit. Second, the victim possesses knowledge 
of and the ability to reconstruct the prior 
criminal occurrence and to identify the defendant 
from her observations of him at the time of the 
crime. And third, the defendant is also 
physically present in the courtroom, so that the 
victim can observe him and compare his appearance 
to that of the offender. 
445 U.S. at 471. In determining whether the in-court identification 
is admissible, the court must focus on whether any of "these three 
elements 'has been come at by exploitation' of the violation of the 
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defendant's Fourth Amendment rights." Crews, 445 U.S. 471, quoting 
Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 488. 
In the present case, the trial court apparently is 
disallowing an in-court identification but permitting identification 
testimony as to descriptions and other identification information 
known to witnesses prior to the illegal seizure. R. 31, 32-6, 126, 
130. The Crews test for determining the taint caused by the illegal 
seizure is equally applicable in determining the taint to 
pre-seizure identification evidence as it is to determining whether 
an in-court identification is admissible. 
Although this case has not yet gone to trial, it appears 
that the State can establish that the presence of Dorothy, Eddy and 
Rodney Knowlden at trial is not the exploitation of the fourth 
amendment violation. 
The second element focuses on the witness' "knowledge of 
and ability to reconstruct the prior criminal occurrence and to 
identify the defendant from [his/] her observations of him at the 
time of the crime." 445 U.S. at 471, 473. In analyzing this 
element, the court focused on the independent recollections of the 
victim in determining that her ability to select the defendant was 
not tainted by the intervening photo array and lineup. The court 
adopted the trial court's determination that the witness' courtroom 
identification "rested upon an independent recollection from her 
initial encounter with the assailant." 445 U.S. at 473. The court 
noted that it "attach[ed] particular significance to the following 
circumstances which support[ed] the trial court's determination." 
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[T]he victim viewed her assailant at close range 
for a period of 5-10 minutes under excellent 
lighting conditions and with no distractions. 
R 4, 7, 111; respondent closely matched the 
description given by the victim immediately after 
the robbery, id., at 52, 59; the victim failed to 
identify anyone other than respondent, id., at 8, 
but twice selected respondent without hesitation 
in nonsuggestive pretrial identification 
procedures, id., at 9-11; and only a week had 
passed between the victim's initial observation 
of respondent and her first identification of 
him, id., at 8-9. 
445 U.S. at 473 n.18. 
In analyzing this second element, the court cautioned that 
a fourth amendment violation could, in some circumstances, "affect 
the reliability of the in-court identification and render it 
inadmissible." Id. at 546. 
Application of this second element in Crews requires 
suppression of the pre-seizure identifications in the present case. 
The most compelling circumstance requiring suppression is the fact 
that there is apparently no record of the descriptions given by 
witnesses prior to the illegal seizure. R. 34. Officers testified 
that they made no attempt to get descriptions of the perpetrator 
prior to entering the Gurule home. R. 280; see discussion supra at 
26. In the absence of such descriptions, it is impossible to 
ascertain whether pre-seizure identification testimony is based on 
untainted independent recollections, or merely the product of 
viewing Mr. Gurule during the illegal showup. This contrasts 
markedly with Crews where the victim gave a detailed description of 
her assailant before viewing him in the photo array and lineup. 
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The conditions for viewing the perpetrator were also 
markedly different than those in Crews. In addition, the showup 
procedure itself was suggestive and tainted by input from other 
onlookers. In Crews. the procedures utilized were not themselves 
suggestive but merely the fruit of an illegal arrest. Repeated 
viewing of an individual often results in increased certainty that 
that person is the perpetrator, regardless of whether the individual 
was initially viewed at the scene of the crime. In this case, the 
witnesses saw Mr. Gurule at the suggestive showup, the preliminary 
hearing, the motion hearing, and in the neighborhood. They all now 
realize that Mr. Gurule is their neighbor. Under such 
circumstances, their memories are tainted by subsequent events, and 
it is impossible for them to make an independent description. 
The third Crews element focuses on whether the defendant's 
presence at trial is the fruit of the fourth amendment violation. 
In this case, there was no basis for linking Mr. Gurule to the 
assault on Mr. Haddenham prior to the fourth amendment violation. 
None of the witnesses told the officers that the person who 
assaulted Dale Haddenham was the neighbor. It was only after seeing 
Mr. Gurule in the showup that the witnesses became convinced that he 
was the perpetrator. Absent the fourth amendment violation, there 
was no basis for linking Mr. Gurule to this crime. The State has 
not established that absent the fourth amendment violation, it would 
have charged Mr. Gurule in this case. 
In State v. Ramirez. 817 P.2d 774, the defendant raised a 
fourth amendment issue as well as a due process eyewitness 
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identification issue. The Utah Supreme Court held that the 
defendant was seized in violation of the fourth amendment and that 
the eyewitness identification was improperly admitted. 
The exclusionary rule applies not only to 
evidence obtained directly as a result of the 
illegal seizure, but also to evidence obtained by 
exploitation of the illegality, unless the 
evidence was obtained by means "'sufficiently 
distinguishable to be purged of the primary 
taint.'" [citations omitted]. Because Wilson's 
identification of Ramirez was a direct result of 
the seizure of Ramirez, it and other evidence 
obtained through exploitation of the seizure must 
be suppressed if the seizure was illegal. 
Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 786. 
In the present case, the State failed to establish that the 
witnesses had independent, specific recollections of the appearance 
of Mr. Haddenham's assailant. The witnesses were present when other 
witnesses were pointing to and selecting Mr. Gurule. They viewed 
him as part of a suggestive identification procedure. There is no 
record of their initial, untainted descriptions. Any description 
the witnesses would now give would be irrevocably tainted by their 
having viewed Mr. Gurule. 
While the witnesses viewed the perpetrator before the 
illegal seizure occurred, their memory of what they saw has now been 
influenced by the subsequent procedures. In the absence of a clear 
record as to what was witnessed prior to the seizure, the State 
cannot meet its burden of establishing that any description is not 
tainted by the subsequent events. 
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CONCLUSION 
Appellant respectfully requests that this Court reverse the 
trial court order allowing evidence of "pre-seizure" identification 
testimony, and remand the case for trial. 
SUBMITTED this \IAL day of December, 1992. 
J6XN C. WATT 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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ADDENDUM A 
IN THE UTAH COURT OFTAEPEALS £>is« -i 
MAR 26 1992 
By 
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State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
Richard M. Gurule, 
Defendant and Petitioner. 
HAR 3 0 1992 
^jj^i^t/^^' 
ryT Nooran 
Cferk oi the Gaurt 
U K J J I L K Deputy CierK 
Case No. 920099-CA 
This matter is before the court on a petition for permission 
to appeal from an interlocutory order. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the petition is granted. All 
proceedings subsequent shall be as, and within the time required, 
for appeals from final judgments. Utah R. App. P. 5(e). 
DATED this^/*7<* day of March, 1992. 
BY THE COURT: 
^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
I tte urcters'gned, Clerk of the Utah Court of Appeals, 
do hereby certify {hat the forego:rg is a full, true and 
correct ccny cJ an original document on file in the Utah 
• Court of Appeals In 'estimony whereof, I have set my 
hand and affixed the seal of the Couc 
^tktJHi 
Mciy^iSfoonan 
Cic-rxcHhe Court 
Deputy Cleric S? 
Date / 
ADDENDUM B 
TEXT OP CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Amendment IV to the Constitution of the United States provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall 
not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the persons or things 
to be seized. 
Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution of Utah provides: 
Sec. 7. [Due process of law.] 
No person shall be deprived of life, 
liberty or property, without due process of law. 
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JAMES C. BRADSHAW, #3768 .-ir.T^ICXr 
Attorney for Defendant 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC. 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Dtah 84111 
Telephone: 532-5444 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
: EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION 
Plaintiff 
v. : 
RICHARD M. GURULE, : Case No. 901901297 
: JUDGE JAMES S. SAWAYA 
Defendant 
The defendant, RICHARD M. GURULE, through counsel, JAMES C. 
BRADSHAW, moves the court to suppress statements of witnesses 
relating to their identification of RICHARD M. GURULE at the trial 
on November 8, 1990 and to suppress their in court identification of 
him. This motion is based on the grounds that the identification 
procedure employed by the police officer violated the defendant's 
rights under the Due Process clauses of the United States 
Constitution and Article I, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution. 
DATED this (^J day of September. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
C. BRADSHAW 
rney for Defendant 
00020 
NOTICE OF HEARING 
TO THE COUNTY ATTORNEY AND THE CLERK OF THE COUNTY COURT: 
You and each of you please take notice that defendant's 
Motion to Suppress Eyewitness Identification will come on regularly 
for a hearing on the 10th day of October, 1990, at the hour of 10:00 
a.m. before the Honorable James S. Sawaya, Third District Court 
Judge. Please govern yourself accordingly. 
DATED this c& day of September, 1990. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
S C. BRADSHAW 
rney for Defendant 
DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the Office of the Salt 
Lake County Attorney, 231 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
this day of September, 1990. 
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 532-5444 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
RICHARD M. GURULE, 
Defendant. 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
AND NOTICE OF HEARING 
Case No. 901901297 
JUDGE JAMES S. SAWAYA 
The defendant, RICHARD GURULE, through his attorney of 
record, JAMES C. BRADSHAW, hereby moves this Court to suppress all 
evidence acquired subsequent to, and as a result of the illegal 
entry into defendant's home in violation of the Fourth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution and Article I Section 14 of the Utah 
State Constitution. 
DATED this 
J. 
V_ day of March, 1991. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
JAMES C. BRADSHAW 
AX t o r n eY for Defendant 
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NOTICE OF HEARING 
TO THE COUNTY ATTORNEY AND THE CLERK OF THE COURT: 
You and each of you please take notice that the above-
entitled matter will come on regularly for hearing on Thursday, the 
11th day of April, 1991, at the hour of 9:00 a.m. before the 
Honorable James S. Sawaya, Third District Court Judge. Please 
govern yourselves accordingly. 
DATED this fr day of March, 1991. 
JAMES JC. BRADSHAW 
llttor/ftey for Defendant 
DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the office of the Sal^  
Lake County Attorney, 231 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
this day of March, 1991. 
00026 
ADDENDUM D 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
vs 
GURULE, RICHARD M 
TYPE OF HEARING: 
PRESENT: 
P. ATTY. 
D. ATTY. 
PLAINTIFF 
DEFENDANT 
MINUTE ENTRY 
CASE NUMBER 901901297 FS 
DATE 04/17/91 
HONORABLE JAMES S. SAWAYA 
COURT REPORTER 
COURT CLERK STG 
DEFENDANT'S MOTIONS TO SUPPRESS HAVING BEEN HEARD BY THIS 
COURT AND THE MATTER OF THE COURT'S DECISION HAVING BEEN TAKEN 
UNDER ADVISEMENT. THE COURT HAVING CONSIDERED AND NOW BEING 
FULLY ADVISED IN THE PREMISES ORDERS SAID MOTIONS BE AND THE 
SAME ARE HEREBY GRANTED. 
CC: JAMES BfcADSHAW 
KEN UPDEGROVE 
nnnoi 
ADDENDUM E 
JAMES C. BRADSHAW (3768) 
Attorney for Defendant 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 532-5444 
MAY 8 1991 
£. 
QtttQ 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
RICHARD M. GURULE, 
Defendant, 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Case No. 901901297FS 
JUDGE JAMES S. SAWAYA 
The above-entitled matter came on for hearing pursuant to 
defendant's Motion to Suppress Eyewitness Identification, and 
defendant's Motion to Suppress based upon violation of the Fourth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution and Arte I, §14 of the 
Utah State Constitution on the 11th day of April, 1991. The 
defendant was present with his attorney, James C. Bradshaw, the 
State was represented by Kenneth Updegrove. The Court heard the 
testimony of Dorothy Knowlden, Eddie Knowlden, Rodney Knowlden, Dan 
Dimmick, Fred Mattfeld, Coy Accock, Kathy Bradley, Lynette Gurule, 
and Daniele Gurule. The Court then having heard the arguments of 
counsel and being provided a copy of State v. Ramirez, #880425 filed 
March 21, 1991, and the Court having previously taken this matter 
00032 
under advisement the Court enters the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On May 1, 1990 officers from the West Valley Police 
Department responded to an alleged aggravated assault situation at 
3215 South Oriole Way. 
2. That upon arriving the officers heard witnesses 
proclaim that someone that might be responsible for the aggravated 
assault had run into the residence at 2561 Starling Avenue. 
3. That 2561 Starling Avenue is the defendant's home. 
4. That although the officers believed that witnesses had 
stated that the perpetrators had entered the residence on Starling 
Avenue, no witnesses had observed the petpetrator enter that 
residence. 
5. That there was no further investigation by the West 
Valley Police Officers prior to their entering the defendant's home 
and had there been further investigation it would have revealed that 
there was, in fact, no basis to believe that the perpetrator of the 
aggravated assault had entered that home. 
6. That the officers pounded on the doors of the Gurule 
home on Starling Avenue until such time as Lynette Gurule came to 
the back door. 
7. That Ms. Gurule refused entry to the home indicating to 
the officers that a search warrant was required prior to entry. 
- 2 -
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8. That the officers entered the Gurule home in the face 
of the refusal by Lynette Gurule and in the absence of any consent 
by her. 
9. That upon entering the home defendant, Richard M. 
Gurule, was seized and he was subsequently forced to appear in a 
"show-up" procedure at which time witnesses to the alleged 
aggravated assault viewed his person. 
10. That the defendant was the only person in the 
"show-up" which matched the physical description of the aggravated 
assault perpetrator. 
11. That there was conflicting testimony in regards as to 
whether the eyewitnesses viewed the participants in the "show-up" 
individually or collectively; that is, while discussing the matter 
with each other. But that in any event at least some of the persons 
claiming to have made an eyewitness identification of the defendant 
had the opportunity to observe other eyewitnesses choose the 
defendant as the perpetrator of the offense prior to making their 
own determination. 
12. That the eyewitnesses had been drinking prior to 
making identification and in at least one instance were drinking 
beer at the time the identification was made. 
13. That the police failed to obtain or maintain any 
permanent record regarding descriptions of the assailant given by 
the eyewitnesses prior to the time the "show-up" occurred. 
- 3 -
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14. That the police failed to record which of the 
eyewitnesses identified the defendant as the perpetrator of the 
assault. 
15. That the police failed to record which of the 
eyewitnesses identified the Richard Gurule as the person who while 
in the house prior to the assault on Mr. Hadenham assaulted Dorothy 
Knowlden and therefore could not have been the assailant of the 
victim, Mr. Hadenham. 
16. That the two eyewitnesses that testified in regards to 
their opportunity to observe the actual assault, testified one had 
five seconds and the other observed the assailant for two seconds. 
Both witnesses acknowledged that it was a stressful situation and 
their attention was diverted by factors such as, other persons 
coming at them. 
WHEREFORE the Court issues the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. That entry into the Gurule home on May 5, 1990 was in 
violation of the defendant's right under the Fourth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution and Art. I, §14 of the Utah State 
Constitution in that the entry to the house was made in the absence 
of exigent circumstances and without a warrant, which easily could 
have been obtained by telephone or other means. 
2. That the illegal entry and subsequent seizure of the 
defendant requires that all evidence acquired as a result of that 
illegal entry and seizure must be ordered suppressed. 
- 4 -
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3. That the failure of the West Valley Police Department 
to accurately record the initial descriptions given by the 
eyewitnesses, and the results of the "show-up" conducted in this 
case along with the suggestive circumstances of the "show-up" itself 
requires suppression under the guidelines articulated in State v. 
Ramirez, supra, Art I, §7, Utah State Constitution. 
DATED this day of May, 1991. 
BY THE 
HONORABLE JAMES Sf SAWAYA 
Third District Court 
DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the Office of the Salt 
Lake County Attorney, 231 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
this day of May, 1991. 
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ADDENDUM G 
PATRICK L. ANDERSON (4787) 
Attorney for Defendant 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION 
424 East 500 South, #300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-5444 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : SUPPLEMENTAL FINDINGS OF 
FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Plaintiff, : 
-v- : 
RICHARD M. GURULE, : Case No. 901901297 
JUDGE JAMES S. SAWAYA 
Defendant. 
The above-entitled matter came on for hearing on the 18th 
day of October, 1991, pursuant to the Court's clarification of a 
portion of its prior order suppressing certain evidence and pursuant 
to defendant's motion to vacate the Court's clarification based on 
lack of jurisdiction. Defendant was present with his attorney, 
Patrick L. Anderson, the State was represented by Kenneth 
Updegrove. The Court having heard the arguments of counsel and 
having previously considered the clarification of a portion of its 
prior order suppressing certain evidence, the court enters the 
following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On September 25, 1990, defendant filed a motion to 
suppress the eyewitness identification. 
2. On March 19, 1991, defendant filed a motion to suppress 
and notice of hearing requesting the court to suppress all evidence 
acquired subsequent to, and as a result of, the illegal entry of 
nni98 
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defendant's home in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution and Article I Section 14 of the Utah State 
Constitution. 
3. Both of defendant's motions to suppress came on for 
hearing on the 11th day of April, 1991. 
4. After hearing the testimony of witnesses and brief 
arguments of counsel and having been provided a copy of State v. 
Ramirez, 159 Utah Adv. Rep. 7 (1991) the Court took the matter under 
advisement. 
5. On April 17, 1991, counsel for the defendant received a 
minute entry, attached hereto is exhibit "A", which stated that, 
"defendant's motions to suppress having been heard by this court and 
the matter of the court's decision having been taken under 
advisement. The court having considered and now being fully advised 
in the premises orders said motions be and the same are hereby 
granted." 
6. That pursuant to the Court's request, counsel for the 
defendant prepared findings of fact and conclusions of law 
consistent with the court's ruling, which was submitted to counsel 
for the state. 
7. That the court signed the findings of fact and 
conclusions of law submitted by the defendant on May 8, 1991. A 
copy of defendant's findings of fact and conclusions of law is 
attached hereto as exhibit "B". 
8. On May 14, 1991, counsel for the State submitted 
plaintiff's objections to defendant's findings of fact and 
-2-
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conclusions of law, A copy of plaintiff's objections is attached 
hereto as exhibit "C"• 
9. On July 23, 1991, counsel for the defendant submitted a 
memorandum in support of defendant's motion for suppression. 
10. On June 26, 1991, counsel for the state submitted a 
memorandum of points and authorities in opposition to defendant's 
position concerning suppression of pre-seizure eyewitness 
identification. 
11. That counsel for the defendant received a minute entry 
dated August 19f 1991 which purported to clarify a portion of the 
court's prior findings of fact and conclusions of law entered on May 
8, 1991. A copy of the minute entry is attached hereto as exhibit 
"D". 
12. That prior to the hearing held on October 18, 1991, 
counsel for the State had not yet received a copy of the minute 
entry attached hereto as exhibit "D". 
13. That defendant is not incarcerated and any further 
delay in this case pending a possible appeal, would not prejudice 
the defendant. 
WHEREFORE the court issues the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. That the eyewitness identification evidence obtained 
prior to the illegal search and seizure may properly be offered and 
admitted if otherwise competent, and is not to be suppressed as part 
of the Court's prior order dated May 8, 1991. 
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2. That the Court had jurisdiction to clarify its prior 
findings of fact and conclusions of law, dated May 8, 1991. 
3. That any further proceedings in this action are stayed 
against the defendant pending the outcome of plaintiff's petition 
for interlocutory appeal which may be filed subsequent to the entry 
of these findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
DATED this day of January, 1992. 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
KENNETH UPDEGROV! 
Deputy County Attorne 
HONORABLE JAMES S. S^fAYA 
Third District Court 
Reze-)\J£D ait 
MAILED/DELIVERED 'a copy of the foregoing -fee- the South 
Valley County Attorney, 2001 South State Street, #S3700, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84190-1200 this ^ZX^^L^ day of January, 1992. 
/^~-*U^££=&> /^fe^2y^&U2^ 
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DAVID E. YOCOM 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
KENNETH R. UPDEGROVE, Bar No. 4931 
Deputy County Attorney 
2001 South State Street, #S3700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190-1200 
Telephone: (801) 468-3422 
FILED 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RICHARD M. GURULE, 
Defendant. 
PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTIONS 
TO DEFENDANT'S FINDINGS 
OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW 
Case No. 901901297FS 
Honorable James S. Sawaya 
Having personally received a copy of the above-captioned 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law from counsel for defendant, 
plaintiff hereby objects as follows: 
EINDINSS OF FACT 
1. Finding No. 1 incorrectly states the date as May 1, 
1990, when the events occurred during the late evening of May 4 and 
early morning of May 5, 1990. When the police arrived on the scene, 
they were initially unsure what had happened. After speaking with 
medical personnel already present, the police were concerned that 
the victim might die. 
2. Finding No. 3 does not state the police were unaware 
that the Starling Avenue address was defendant's home. 
00037 
3. Defendant's Findings do not indicate the police concerns 
for the safety of any individuals who might be within the Starling 
Avenue address particularly when there was no response to their 
several minutes of knocking, the young woman who finally came to the 
door claimed there were no other individuals present and the police 
heard movement and later saw other individuals within the home, and 
the young woman's extreme nervousness. 
4. There was conflicting testimony whether or not Lynette 
Gurule asked the police for a search warrant as stated in Finding 
No. 7. 
5. Finding No. 8 does not reflect that there was testimony 
indicating Lynette Gurule eventually gave some form of consent for 
the police to enter the Starling Avenue home. 
6. Finding No. 9 does not reflect defendant's eventual 
agreement to appear in the "show up- along with the other young 
males discovered in the Starling Avenue home. Defendant was not 
dragged from the home. 
7. Finding No. 12 does not reflect testimony that none of 
the witnesses were drunk at the time they made their identifications. 
The Knowlden family party had begun less than an hour prior to the 
uninvited individuals entering their home. 
8. Finding No. 15 does not reflect that plaintiff has not 
nor does it intend to charge defendant with an assault on Dorothy 
Knowlden. Testimony was received that defendant might have been at 
the bottom of the stairs close to the front door which would have 
allowed him to quickly get into a position for an assault on Mr. 
Haddenham. 
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9. Finding No. 16 does not correctly state the range of 
time during which the witnesses were only a matter of feet from the 
assailant nor does it indicate the excellent quality of the lighting 
at the time of the assault. 
10. Additionally, because the results of the -show up-
flowing from the illegal entry are being suppressed. Finding Nos. 10 
through 15 are not needed and tend to add elements unnecessary to 
the disposition of defendant's Motion to Suppress. The same can be 
said of Finding No. 16 which deals with eyewitness testimony during 
the assault and prior to the police entering defendant's home. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Conclusion No. 3 is confusing and superfluous. 
Conclusion No. 2 clearly states all evidence acquired as a result of 
the illegal entry and seizure is to be suppressed. This includes 
the "show up" and the results obtained. 
DATED this day of May, 1991. 
KENNETH R. UPDEGROV^ 77 
Deputy Salt Lake County Attorney 
-3-
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Plaintiff's Objections to Defendant's Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law was delivered to James C. Bradshaw, counsel for 
defendant, by placement in the Legal Defender Association box in the 
Salt Lake County Attorney's Office on this day of May, 1991. 
mrr/1519 
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